

METAPHOR

A *metaphor* is saying one thing is another thing: He's a rat and she is poison.

A *simile* is a mere comparison of one thing to another that identifies a resemblance between the two but retains the rationality of vertical consciousness, which does not resist a simple comparison. A *sign* is an image that represents or stands for only one idea or one thing, such as a traffic stop sign or the logo of a company. A *sign* becomes a *metaphor* when it is completely identified with the idea or thing it represents. Advertisers use endorsers such as popular figures or cute animals as *metaphors* of products in an effort to identify their appealing characteristics with the products they are advertising. The identification in the mind of a consumer is usually subliminal or subconscious.

In a work of literature, a metaphor is usually explicit and is appreciated by a perceptive reader. In *The Great Gatsby* the image of Dr. T. J. Eckleberg with huge blank eyes is a billboard *sign* that becomes a *metaphor* of commercial values dominating society. Then the eyes expand to a *symbol* of materialism, a false "God" blindly staring out from on high over an ashy wasteland that evokes the spiritual wasteland in the famous poem by T. S. Eliot, which became a motif in 20th-century American literature. *Signs* are the language of ordinary consciousness, which is rational, literal-minded and "vertical" in that it subordinates the rest of the psyche to its functions. In the decadent "literary" criticism of the late 20th century, many academics reduced *metaphors* and *symbols* to mere *signs*, or "signifiers." This made it easier for liberals to impose their own theories, jargon and politics. *Similes*, *metaphors*, *symbols*, *archetypal symbols* and *monads* transcend the *sign* language and "signifiers" of rational consciousness.

When a *metaphor* identifies one thing completely with a separate different thing, the rational mind resists, which is why poetry became so unpopular during the rationalistic 20th century. Fusing two different things in a *metaphor* puts them on the same plane, in effect tipping consciousness from vertical to a "horizontal" mode. The fusion overturns the tyranny of vertical consciousness, integrates the two hemispheres of the brain and thereby facilitates the individuation process toward psychological wholeness. Huck Finn enacts this process when he runs away from the vertical puritanism of Miss Watson and the Widow, "kills" his conditioned self to a limited extent and floats down the river with Jim in a horizontal mode. The relationship of Huck (alienated heart) and Jim (enslaved soul) becomes a *metaphor* of ideal psychological as well as racial integration, imperfect because both are conditioned into mental bondage by a racist society as personified in Pap and Tom (immature head).

Whereas a *metaphor* identifies one thing with another, a *symbol* generates any number of implications and connections with many other things, the meanings of which are determined by its context in a dream or work of art--in a gestalt. *Symbolism* is the primal language of the unconscious. Comprehending *symbols* and their relationships in dreams and art furthers the integration of the conscious and unconscious minds, deepening perception and furthering individuation. The multiple implications of a *symbol* derive from its being implicit rather than explicit. As a general rule, any explanation of a *symbol* inevitably lessens its multiplicity, due to the limitations of words, however precise. This is why most writers refuse to explain *symbols* in their own work and some, like Hemingway, even deny they are consciously there. Also, many artists, especially the unschooled, are in fact unaware of the archetypal *symbols* that arise naturally from the unconscious into their art. Human consciousness itself has been defined as a *metaphor* of the outer world, and a work of art as a *metaphor* of Nature.

When any one meaning of a *symbol* is explained, it is reduced to a *metaphor*. In the exceptional case of *Moby-Dick*, Melville states twice in the text that the white whale represents "Truth." This *metaphor* defines his *allegory* of *symbols* precisely without reducing the meanings of the whale very much because (1) Truth is so comprehensive a concept; (2) the white whale is both *archetypal* and *monadic*--a *symbol* of totality, and (3) in "The Doubloon" chapter, different members of the crew interpret the coin--which is made analogous to (a *metaphor* of) the whale--variously.

Michael Hollister (2015)

“Much the most important point is to be able to use *metaphors*, for this is the one thing that cannot be learned from others; and it is also a mark of genius, since a good *metaphor* implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars.”

Aristotle
Poetics xxii, 16-17

HANDBOOK DEFINITIONS

“*Metaphor*: A figure of speech in which a word or phrase is applied to a person, idea, or object to which it is not literally applicable. A *metaphor* is an implied analogy which imaginatively identifies one thing with another. A *metaphor* is one of the tropes, a device by which an author turns, or twists, the meaning of a word. For example, Martin Luther wrote ‘A mighty fortress is our God, / A bulwark never failing’; ‘mighty fortress’ and ‘bulwark’ are metaphors. Wordsworth wrote metaphorically when he said of England that ‘she is a fen of stagnant waters’.”

Harry Shaw
Concise Dictionary of Literary Terms
(McGraw-Hill 1976)

“*Metaphor*: Greek *metaphor*, transference; *meta*, over; *pherein*, to carry. The application of a name or a descriptive term to an object to which it is not literally applicable. An implied comparison. It is based on the idea of the similarity in dissimilars. ‘*Metaphor* is a great excellence in style,’ said [Samuel] Johnson, ‘when used with propriety, for it gives you two ideas for one; conveys the meaning more luminously, and generally with a perception of delight.’

[George] Santayana said, in *Life of Reason*: ‘There’s no poetry in identifying things that look alike. But the most opposite things may become miraculously equivalent, if they arouse the same visible quality of emotion. Even the sound and rhythm of words, in a sensitive language, have some congruity with the nature of the things signified.’

I. A. Richards, *Practical Criticism*: ‘A metaphor is a shift, a carrying over of a word from its normal use to a new one. In a sense *metaphor*, the shift of the word, is occasioned and justified by a similarity or analogy between the object it is usually applied to and the new object. In an emotive *metaphor* the shift occurs through some similarity between the feelings the new situation and the normal situation arouse. The same word may, in different contexts, be either a sense or an emotive *metaphor*. If you call a man a swine, for example, it may be because you have towards him something of the feeling you conventionally have towards pigs, or because you propose, if possible, to excite those feelings. Both *metaphorical* shifts may be combined simultaneously, and they often are’.”

A child said What is grass? fetching it to
one with full hands;...
And now it seems to me the beautiful uncut
hair of graves.

Walt Whitman, “Song of Myself”

A. F. Scott
Current Literary Terms
(Macmillan/St. Martin’s 1965)

“*Metaphor* is a special kind of comparison, usually of something unknown to something known for the sake of clarification of the former. However, both referents are affected by the comparison, and the reader must determine what features are truly comparable and relevant in context. For example, to describe someone as a snake suggests physical or emotional qualities that are less than desirable; but the reader must apply only certain mutual features to the man and not try to demonstrate that there is an absolute physical identity or that the man literally sheds his skin every year....

The function of *metaphor* in literature has to do, essentially, with its suggestive power in the explanation or clarification of objects, persons, ideas, emotions, or situations. Basically, it involves the application of a noun, adjective, verb, phrase, or larger syntactical unit to a situation to which it is not literally applicable. Some critics go so far as to say that the more unexpected the analogy, the better the *metaphor*....

Predictably, in the history of language, *metaphor* accounts for changes in meaning of many words and even for the creation of new words. As *metaphors* become commonly used, their *metaphoric* suggestiveness is lost or forgotten--they become 'dead *metaphors*.' The etymology of a word sometimes reveals such a forgotten *metaphor*, as in *arrive*, which comes from the Latin *arrivo* (*adriivas*)—"at the banks." The word was *metaphorically* applied to forms of transportation other than by water. Eventually, the origin became obscure, and the word now functions literally for all forms of transportation.... *Metaphor* may lose potency through the floridity of overuse, the triteness of repeated use, the changing of vehicles in midstream (mixed metaphor), and too fanciful or too obvious a relationship between referents....

Although it is common for a *metaphor* to use a concrete word to suggest abstract qualities or feelings, this is not always the case. In 'The Dead,' Joyce describes the snow (itself the concrete part of other metaphors) as falling 'like the descent of our last end.' Here the concrete image, the snow, is clarified by the comparison of it to a more abstract thing, increasing the effectiveness of the concrete image's implications.... *Simile* is a subgroup of *metaphor* in which the comparison is made explicit by the use of *like* or *as*. *Metaphor* is the core of figurative language since all figures of thought depend on the perception of resemblances between, or similar attitudes toward, the tenor and the vehicle."

M. M. Liberman & Edward E. Foster
A Modern Lexicon of Literary Terms
(Scott, Foresman 1968)

"*Metaphor*: An analogy identifying one object with another and ascribing to the first object one or more qualities of the second. I. A. Richards's distinction between the tenor and the vehicle of a *metaphor* may be useful. The tenor is the idea being expressed or the subject of the comparison; the vehicle is the image by which this idea is conveyed or the subject communicated. When Shakespeare writes:

That time of year thou mayst in me behold
When yellow leaves, or none, or few, do hang
Upon those boughs which shake against the cold,
Bare ruined choirs where late the sweet birds sang--

the tenor is old age, the vehicle is the season of late fall or early winter, conveyed through a group of images unusually rich in implications. The tenor and vehicle taken together constitute the figure, trope, or 'turn' in meaning that the *metaphor* conveys. At one extreme, the vehicle may be merely a means of decorating the tenor; at the other extreme, the tenor may be merely an excuse for having the vehicle. *Allegory*, for example, may be thought of as an elaborate *metaphor* in which the tenor is never expressed, although it is implied. In the simplest kinds of *metaphors* there is an obvious direct resemblance objectively existing between tenor and vehicle, and in some *metaphors*, particularly those that lend themselves to elaborate conceits, the relation between tenor and vehicle is in the mind of the maker of the *metaphor*, rather than in specific qualities of vehicle or tenor.

Aristotle praised the *metaphor* as 'the greatest thing by far' for poets--a sentiment seconded by Ezra Pound, who endorsed Aristotle's calling apt *metaphor* 'the hallmark of genius'--and saw it as the product of their insight, which permitted them to find the similarities in seemingly dissimilar things. It ought to be noted that Aristotle's attention to the art of finding resemblances resembles the lineaments of his doctrine of formal mimesis; art in a way is a *metaphor* for Nature. Modern criticism follows Aristotle in placing a similarly high premium on poets' abilities to make *metaphors*, and analytical criticism tends to find almost as much rich suggestiveness in the differences between the things compared as it does in the recognition of surprising but unsuspected similarities. Cleanth Brooks uses the term 'functional *metaphor*' to describe the way in which the *metaphor* is able to have 'referential' and 'emotive' characteristics and to go beyond them

and become a direct means in itself of representing a truth incommunicable by any other means. Clearly, when a *metaphor* performs this function, it is behaving as a *symbol*.”

C. Hugh Holman & William Harmon
A Handbook to Literature, 6th edition
(Macmillan 1936-92)

ANALYSIS OF METAPHOR

“*Metaphor*...is the synthesis of several units of observation into one commanding image; it is the expression of a complex idea, not by analysis, nor by abstract statement, but by a sudden perception of an objective relation. The complex idea is translated into a simple concrete equivalent.... The ability to invent new *metaphors* is a sign of a poetic mind; and the main use of *metaphors* is always poetical.... The precision sought for is one of equivalence, not of analytical description. And as prose is essentially the art of analytical description, it would seem that *metaphor* is of no particular relevance to it; for poetry it is perhaps a more necessary mode of expression.

We may say quite generally that the use of *metaphor* tends to obscure the essential nature of prose, because it substitutes a poetic equivalence for a direct statement. For this reason many of our best writers have been chary of this mode of writing--as Swift. ‘The rogue never hazards a metaphor,’ said [Dr. Samuel] Johnson. ‘Never’ is perhaps an exaggeration, but it is true that we may read Swift for many pages without encountering imagery of any kind, except such as was at that time embodied in common speech.... [Hemingway likewise avoids *metaphors*, though his writing is vivid with imagery and rich in *symbolism*].

We may compare the particular qualities of one object to the general qualities of another, and this constitutes a *simile*. If we go a step further, and in a manner identify the man and the squirrel, as in ‘This man, the squirrel of his clan, climbed the high trees’--then we invent a *metaphor*.... The *simile*, in which a comparison is made directly between two objects, belongs to an earlier stage of literary expression: it is the deliberate elaboration of a correspondence, often pursued for its own sake. But a *metaphor* is the swift illumination of an equivalence. Two images, or an idea and an image, stand equal and opposite; clash together and respond significantly, surprising the reader with sudden light.

This light may either illuminate or decorate the sentence in which it is found; and perhaps we may divide all *metaphors* into the illuminative and the decorative. By doing so we can make more distinct the limited relevance of *metaphor* to prose writing; for while both kinds are appropriate to poetry, only the illuminative *metaphor* will be found appropriate in pure prose style. In narrative prose...there is no need for either illumination or decoration; *metaphors* would merely impede the action and are therefore properly discarded. In exposition, whether of the descriptive kind or of the persuasive kind, it is again difficult to see any justification for decorative *metaphors*. These are generally introduced either to display the poetic tendency of the writer’s mind, and are therefore out of place; or to give an alternative expression to a thought which has already been expressed in direct language. In this case they are redundant.

But it often happens in exposition that abstract language is inadequate to express a meaning clearly, and then *metaphor* may be introduced to illuminate the thought. Paradoxically, it is in scientific prose that the illuminative *metaphor* is most effectively used. The history of language and of early poetry, as well as the general results of modern psychology, according to a well-known logician, confirm the view that ‘*metaphors* are not merely artificial devices for making discourse more vivid and poetical, but are also necessary for the apprehension and communication of new ideas.’ *Metaphors* are often the way in which creative minds perceive things, so that the explicit recognition that we are dealing with an analogy rather than a real identity comes later as a result of further reflection and analysis. The language of scientific pioneers like Faraday, Darwin and Huxley abounds in illuminative *metaphors*....

The historical evolution of an art often runs from complexity to simplicity, and Jespersen has suggested that this is true also of the development of language. It would seem to be true not only of language itself but also of the arts of language. Each literature is characterized by the frequent use of riddles and periphrases (‘kennings’). Riddles are primitive *metaphors*, roundabout descriptions or stories designed to convey their subject as a sudden and vivid revelation in the mind of the reader.... Kennings are very

characteristic of Anglo-Saxon literature; for examples: 'world-candle' (sun), 'word-ward' (mind or speech), 'battle-adders' (arrows), 'the head jewels' (eyes). They differ from later *metaphors* in that they have a deceptive intention, and may, indeed, have their origin in some form of taboo. Primitive man associated the thing and its name in an intimate fashion, and when the thing was an object of veneration or fear, he would seek for some form of periphrasis so as to avoid a direct reference. A kenning is a simple periphrasis of this kind.

Metonymy is a special form of periphrasis; something associated with an idea is made to serve for the expression of that idea. 'From the cradle to the grave,' 'Loyalty to the throne,' 'an officer of the Crown.' *Synecdoche* is still another type of concise periphrasis; a part of a thing is made to serve for the expression of the whole. 'A fleet of fifty sail,' 'All hands on deck,' 'A force of a thousand rifles.' The use of all these forms of periphrasis is a matter of discretion; they are better avoided unless they are fresh enough to add to the vividness or significance of a passage; or unless they have become so current as to pass without equivocation for the master word. *Personification*...is another figure of speech related to *metaphor*, and has its origins in primitive modes, such as the Anglo-Saxon riddle; but like *metaphor*, of which, indeed, it is a collapsed form (for one of the terms of comparison has been suppressed, or identified with the object to which it is compared), it is more appropriate to poetic expression. It consists of endowing inanimate things with animate (and generally human) action. A sustained process of personification...may sometimes be used to give vitality to descriptive prose, but only with discretion.

The concision of *personification*, of *metonymy* and of *synecdoche*, was one way of escape from the complexity and unwieldiness of the periphrasis and the riddle. Comparison, *simile* and *metaphor* renounce the mere love of indirectness; they denote a growth in poetic sensibility, and in the use of *metaphor* we have, indeed, one of the main agents in the growth of intelligence. It has been a main agent, too, in the growth of language, most words and idioms being in the nature of dead *metaphors*. But whatever we may say of it, and however great and inclusive the function we assign to it, essentially it belongs to the sphere of poetry. But it is equally possible to say that science itself, in its formative stage, also belongs to the sphere of poetry."

Herbert Read
English Prose Style
(1952; Beacon 1963) 23-32

SIMILE AND METAPHOR

"*Metaphor* in its radical, which is to say in its semantic sense, is far more than a grammatical maneuver or a rhetorical stratagem. The essence of *metaphor* consists in a semantic tension which subsists among the heterogeneous elements brought together in some striking image or expression. Poetic language implicitly crossweaves multiplicity-in-unity and unity-in-multiplicity; it is tensive because of the precarious balance between two or more lines of association which it invites the imagination to contemplate. Of course I do not mean that every poem must be of a highly *metaphoric* and tensive kind.... A poem can be very direct and must indeed have a sustaining degree of presentative immediacy. Still, whatever else poetic language may be and do, its exploitation of essential *metaphor*, which is to say of *metaphoric* tension, properly guided with reference to the poetic context, is one of its most distinctive and triumphant achievements.

Since *metaphor* is the most important element in expressive language, our ways of thinking about it need to be rescued from misleading habits of thought and particularly from the long tyranny of the grammarians. The familiar textbook definition, descended from Aristotle and Quintillion, is based upon syntactical, not semantic considerations. Both of those ancient masters of rhetorical theory regarded *metaphor* as little else than abbreviated simile. And since this jejune view of the matter had imposed itself upon readers' minds, it is important to understand the reason for its inadequacy.

Aristotle illustrates his view of the relation of *metaphor* to *simile* as follows: 'When the poet says of Achilles, "He sprang on them like a lion," this is *simile*. When he says, "The lion sprang on them," this is *metaphor*; for as both animals are brave, he has transferred the name of "lion" to Achilles.' Elsewhere he calls *simile* 'a *metaphor* with a preface' and declares it inferior to *metaphor* on two counts: it is lengthier, therefore less pleasing; and 'since it does not affirm that this is that, the mind does not inquire into the

matter.’ Now it is true that *metaphor* is often (not, I think, always) preferable to *simile* on both these grounds, but the grounds are rhetorical and not semantic ones. Terseness is more pleasing and more stimulating to thought than verbosity: that is what it comes to. And by no means let us ignore the canons of good rhetoric, whether in poetry or out of it!

Poetry is not less than rhetoric, but something more. Nevertheless the rhetorical distinction, whatever its incidental uses, can hardly be said to open up any important insight. It evinces that great vice of bad classification: overstressing an obvious surface difference and ignoring the differences and resemblances that go to the heart of the matter. By Aristotle’s rule it is *simile* to say, ‘He dances like a clumsy elephant,’ and *metaphor* to say, ‘That clumsy elephant gets in everyone’s way.’ But there is no semantic difference here--no difference, that is to say, in degree of intensity, or in depth of penetration, or in freshness of recombination, or in anything else that matters much. The difference is merely one of rhetorical strategy.

A far more adequate definition is Herbert Read’s: ‘*Metaphor* is the synthesis of several units of observation into one commanding image; it is the expression of a complex idea, not by analysis, nor by direct statement, but by a sudden perception of an objective relation.’ *Metaphor*, by this criterion, could include some instances of what is traditionally designated *simile*--given the commanding image and the sudden perception of an objective relation. George Eliot writes: ‘That sudden clang, that leaping light, fell on Romola like sharp wounds’; and while superficially the sentence contains one *metaphor* (‘leaping light’) and one *simile* (‘like sharp wounds’), I would say that we grasp the full resident meaning more nearly if we take the entire sentence as projecting a complex *metaphoric* fusion or *metaphoric* tension. The tensive quality of George Eliot’s figure is clearly something more than that simple terseness and economy which Quintillion finds admirable in the *similes* of Cicero, such as: ‘He fled from court like a man escaping naked from a fire.’

Cicero’s *simile* rests on a plain logical analogy, and the pleasure which it gives, if any, is simply of intellectual recognition. The same may be said of many tropes which have the grammatical form of *metaphor*, as when Aeschylus calls a harbor the stepmother of ships. This minor piece of wit is not *metaphor* in the essential and semantic sense of the word, for it makes its connection by analysis and labored comparison rather than by the ‘sudden perception of an objective relation.’ One might perhaps call it a tabloid *simile*. It lacks what Martin Foss calls the ‘energy-tension’ proper to real *metaphor*. Compare it with Homer’s description of the wrathful Apollo: ‘His coming was like the night.’ Grammatically considered Aeschylus’ trope is a *metaphor* and Homer’s is a *simile*; semantically and essentially the distinction stands in reverse. Why so? Because of the great difference of semantic energy-tension. Homer’s comparison stirs us emotionally as with a sudden revelation of half-guessed half-hidden mystery, whereas Aeschylus’ phrase pleases us superficially as a riddle or a joke might do.”

Philip Wheelwright
The Burning Fountain:
A Study in the Language of Symbolism
(1968; Peter Smith 1982) 102-05

CONSCIOUSNESS AS METAPHOR

“Let us speak of metaphor. The most fascinating property of language is its capacity to make metaphors. But what an understatement! For metaphor is not a mere extra trick of language, as it is so often slighted in the old schoolbooks on composition; it is the very constitutive ground of language. I am using metaphor here in its most general sense: the use of a term for one thing to describe another because of some kind of similarity between them or between their relations to other things. There are thus always two terms in a metaphor, the thing to be described, which I shall call the *metaphrand*, and the thing or relation used to elucidate it, which I shall call the *metaphier*. A metaphor is always a known metaphier operating on a less known metaphrand....

It is by metaphor that language grows. The common reply to the question ‘what is it?’ is, when the reply is difficult or the experience unique, ‘well, it is like--.’ In laboratory studies, both children and adults describing nonsense objects (or metaphrands) to others who cannot see them use extended metaphiers that with repetition become contracted into labels. This is the major way in which the vocabulary of language is

formed. The grand and vigorous function of metaphor is the generation of new language as it is needed, as human culture becomes more and more complex....

The human body is a particularly generative metaphier, creating previously unspeakable distinctions in a throng of areas. The *head* of an army, table, page, bed, ship, household, or nail, or of steam or water; the *face* of a clock, cliff, card, or crystal; the *eyes* of needles, winds, storms, targets, flowers, or potatoes; the *brow* of a hill; the *cheeks* of a vice; the *teeth* of cogs or combs; the *lips* of pitchers, craters, augers; the *tongues* of shoes, board *joints*...the *arm* of a chair or the sea; the *leg* of a table, compass, sailor's voyage, or cricket field; and so on and on. Or the *foot* of this page. Or the *leaf* you will soon turn. All of these concrete metaphors increase enormously our powers of perception of the world about us and our understanding of it, and literally create new objects. Indeed, language is an organ of perception, not simply a means of communication.... In the abstractions of human relations, the skin becomes a particularly important metaphier. We get or stay 'in touch' with others who may be 'thick-' or 'thin-skinned' or perhaps 'touchy' in which case they have to be 'handled' carefully lest we 'rub them the wrong way'; we may have a 'feeling' for another person with whom we may have a 'touching experience.'

The concepts of science are all of this kind, abstract concepts generated by concrete metaphors. In physics, we have force, acceleration (to increase one's steps), inertia (originally an indolent person), impedance, resistance, fields, and now charm. In physiology, the metaphor of a machine has been at the very center of discovery. We understand the brain by metaphors to everything from batteries and telegraphy to computers and holograms. Medical practice is sometimes dictated by metaphor. In the eighteenth century, the heart in fever was like a boiling pot, and so bloodletting was prescribed to reduce its fuel. And even today, a great deal of medicine is based upon the military metaphor of defense of the body against attacks of this or that. The very concept of law in Greek derives from *nomos*, the word for the foundations of a building. To be liable, or bound in law, comes from the Latin *ligare*, meaning to bind with cord.

In early times, language and its referents climbed up from the concrete to the abstract on the steps of metaphors, even, we may say, created the abstract on the bases of metaphors. It is not always obvious that metaphor has played this all-important function. But this is because the concrete metaphiers become hidden in phonemic change, leaving the words to exist on their own. Even such an unmetaphorical-sounding word as the verb 'to be' was generated from a metaphor. It comes from the Sanscrit *bhu*, 'to grow, or make grow,' while the English forms 'am' and 'is' have evolved from the same root as the Sanscrit *asmi*, 'to breathe'.... Abstract words are ancient coins whose concrete images in the busy give-and-take of talk have worn away with use.... If we ever achieve a language that has the power of expressing everything, then metaphor will no longer be possible. I would not say, in that case, my love is like a red, red rose, for love would have exploded into terms for its thousands of nuances, and applying the correct term would leave the rose metaphorically dead...

In trying to understand a thing we are trying to find a metaphor for that thing.... Understanding a thing is to arrive at a metaphor for that thing by substituting something more familiar to us. And the feeling of familiarity is the feeling of understanding.... So, in...science, we say we understand an aspect of Nature when we can say it is similar to some familiar theoretical model. The terms *theory* and *model*, incidentally, are sometimes used interchangeably. But really they should not be. A theory is a relationship of the model to the things the model is supposed to represent.... A model is neither true nor false; only the theory of its similarity to what it represents. And theory is thus a metaphor between a model and data. And understanding in science is the feeling of similarity between complicated data and a familiar model....

Consciousness is being thought of as a thing, and so like other things must have a location, which...it does not actually have in the physical sense.... Subjective conscious mind is an analog of what is called the real world. It is built up with a vocabulary or lexical field whose terms are all metaphors or analogs of behavior in the physical world. Its reality is of the same order as mathematics. It allows us to shortcut behavioral processes and arrive at more adequate decisions. Like mathematics, it is an operator rather than a thing or repository.... The most prominent group of words used to describe mental events are visual. We 'see' solutions to problems, the best of which may be 'brilliant,' and the person 'brighter' and 'clear-

headed' as opposed to 'dull,' 'fuzzy-minded,' or 'obscure' solutions. These words are all metaphors and the mind-space to which they apply is a metaphor of actual space....

As with a real space, something can be at the 'back' of our mind, in its 'inner recesses,' or 'beyond' our mind, or 'out' of our mind. In argument we try to 'get things through' to someone, to 'reach' their 'understanding' or find a 'common ground,' or 'point out,' etc., all actions in real space taken over analogically into the space of the mind.... Now when we say mind-space is a metaphor of real space, it is the real 'external' world that is the metaphier.... Consciousness becomes the metaphier full of our past experience... And it is by the generated structure of consciousness that we then understand the world. What kinds of things can we say about that structure?...

FEATURES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

1. *Spatialization*: ...You cannot, absolutely cannot think of time except by spatializing it. Consciousness is always a spatialization...in which what has happened in time is excerpted and seen in side-by-sidedness. This spatialization is characteristic of all conscious thought... Every conscious thought that you are having in reading this book can...be traced back to concrete actions in a concrete world.

2. *Excerption*: In consciousness, we are never 'seeing' anything in its entirety. This is because such 'seeing' is an analog of actual behavior; and in actual behavior we can only see or pay attention to a part of a thing at any one moment. And so consciousness. We excerpt from the collection of possible attentions to a thing which comprises our knowledge of it. And this is all that it is possible to do since consciousness is a metaphor of our actual behavior.... Writers and artists are doing in a controlled way what happens 'in' consciousness more haphazardly. Excerption is distinct from memory. An excerpt of a thing is in consciousness the representative of the thing or event to which memories adhere, and by which we can retrieve memories.... Reminiscence is a succession of excerpts....

3. *The Analog 'I'*: A most important 'feature' of this metaphor 'world' is the metaphor we have of ourselves, the analog 'I,' which can 'move about'...in our 'imagination,' 'doing' things that we are not actually doing....

4. *The Metaphor 'Me'*: The analog 'I' is, however, not simply that. It is also a *metaphor 'me.'* As we imagine ourselves strolling down the longer path we indeed catch 'glimpses' of 'ourselves'... We can both look out from within the imagined self at the imagined vistas, or we can step back a bit and see our ourselves...

5. *Narratization*: In consciousness, we are always seeing our...selves as the main figures in the stories of our lives.... We are constantly doing this whenever we are being conscious, and this I call narratization.... New situations are selectively perceived as part of this ongoing story, perceptions that do not fit into it being unnoticed or at least unremembered...situations are chosen which are congruent to this ongoing story, until the picture I have of myself in my life story determines how I am to act and choose in novel situations as they arise.... But it is not just our own analog 'I' that we are narratizing; it is everything else in consciousness. A stray fact is narratized to fit with some other stray fact....

6. *Conciliation:* ...In conciliation we are making excerpts or narratizations compatible with each other, just as in external perception the new stimulus and the internal connection are made to agree.... If I ask you to think of a mountain meadow and a tower at the same time, you automatically conciliate them by having the tower rising from the meadow. But if I ask you to think of the mountain meadow and an ocean at the same time, conciliation tends not to occur and you are likely to think of one and then the other. You can only bring them together by narratization....

Consciousness is an operation rather than a thing, a repository, or a function. It operates by way of analogy, by way of constructing an analog space with an analog 'I' that can observe that space, and move metaphorically in it. It operates on any reactivity, excerpts relevant aspects, narratizes and conciliates them together in a metaphorical space where such meanings can be manipulated like things in space. Conscious mind is a spatial analog of the world and mental acts are analogs of bodily acts. Consciousness operates only on objectively observable things. Or, to say it another way with echoes of John Locke, there is nothing in consciousness that is not an analog of something that was in behavior first....

If consciousness is this invention of an analog world on the basis of language, paralleling the behavioral world even as the world of mathematics parallels the world of quantities of things, what then can we say about its origin?... If consciousness is based on language, then it follows that it is of much more recent origin that has heretofore been supposed. Consciousness comes *after* language!"

Julian Jaynes
*The Origin of Consciousness
in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind*
(Houghton 1976) 48-55, 59-66

Michael Hollister (2015)